INTRODUCTION
Over the last five years, the use of social media and social networks such as Twitter, Facebook, Yammer and Instagram by citizens at times of crisis has gained the attention of professionals operating in crisis response organizations, such as the police, fire service and medical teams (Palen, 2008; Merchant, Elmer, & Lurie, 2011) . In the crisis management literature it has been recognized for decades that citizens are self-reliant when there is social disruption and in crisis situations, whether those are incidents, emergencies or large-scale disasters (Helsloot & Ruitenberg, 2004) . Nowadays, social media platforms provide a new opportunity for people to keep each other informed, adding a bottom-up information network that provides a platform for online communication (Machjzrack & More, 2010) . In addition, they can potentially provide welcome additional resources for professionals in crisis response organizations. The promise is that, by using social media data, the first responders can enlarge their common operational picture (COP) (Yin, Lampert, Cameron, Robinson, & Power, 2012 ).
Yet, although the response organizations have started to recognize the importance of social media data during times of crisis, how this data actually can be made sense of, interpreted, validated and used is still an issue that requires further research. Therefore, professional crisis response organizations have also carried out (pilot) information management projects to understand how social media platforms actually work and how they can include social media data in their operations, both day-to-day and during crises. Over the years, many pilot projects have been implemented to test social media platforms as early warning systems, and to provide professionals with data that predicts upcoming social disruptions (Goolsby, 2010) . In particular, the police have undertaken projects to determine how they could use social media data in their surveillance activities (Crump, 2011) . Whereas for a long time social media data was regarded merely as 'noise' or, at best, not validated data 1 , these projects indicate that crisis response managers and professionals are starting to take social media and Web 2.0 platforms seriously. Their problem, however, is how to incorporate these new information flows properly into existing information architectures in order to build a coherent crisis information system and, eventually, make the emergency response more reliable.
In this chapter we will present a project management case from the physical safety in the Netherlands, where 25 safety regions were established in 2007 to cover the crisis response across the whole country (Boersma, Groenewegen, & Wagenaar, 2010; Boersma, Wagenaar, & Wolbers, 2012) . The safety regions have various functions. First, they facilitate integration between the two main first response disciplines: the fire service and the ambulance service medical teams. They work closely together with the police, who are organized at the national level in the Netherlands. Second, each safety region has had to establish a bureau responsible for developing emergency response plans and strategies and for how their professionals communicate with those in other emergency services, with policymakers and with citizens. Third, the safety region bureau is responsible for undertaking a specific risk analysis and assessment for the region. Finally, the safety region must ensure that there is a dispatch center, or emergency response room function, available. In the response room all three of the first response disciplines or services (police, fire and ambulance) are represented. The response room can be shared with other safety regions, on condition that the on condition that they are still able to respond adequately to incoming calls from citizens from across their own region.
Since 2012, those responsible for managing the safety regions have started to improve their crisis information management by implementing social media projects. For the various professionals working in the safety regions, however, it is still difficult to include social media data in their information management at times of emergency. The case we will present in this chapter is a pilot project from one of the 25 Dutch safety regions. In this region a project called Twitcident has been put in place to see how social media data -and in particular data from Twitter -could be used in the response room setting. It is a web-based system for filtering, searching and analyzing data on real-world incidents or crises. The project started in April 2014 and has been used by the region. We studied the implementation of the project and interviewed the professionals who were directly and indirectly involved in the introduction and in the actual use of Twitcident. We studied the aims and goals of the project, the expectations of the professionals involved, how Twitcident was used, and the first results. Our research question is: We collected our data through observations and interviews during the first half of 2014. Our main concern was to understand both the expectations of the management and the experience of actually using Twitcident, a framework and web-based system for filtering, searching and analyzing data on real-world incidents or crises (Abel, Hauff, Houben, Stronkman, & Tao, 2012) . In both of these areas, sensemaking in crisis situations (Weick, 1988 ) was a central issue for us: we were curious to know how those involved made sense of the complex coordination and information-sharing practices in emergency and crisis situations. Sensemaking is seen by Weick as a cognitive activity and ability of framing experienced situations as meaningful. Collective sensemaking is the collaborative process in which different individuals start to create shared awareness and understanding of the situation.
We conducted a total of 17 interviews with managers, information system engineers (who were responsible for the actual implementation of the project), professionals from the region's emergency response room, and police officers. Our most important sources of information were the centralists and generalists working in the response room. The centralists who do the intake (i.e., receive the incoming emergency calls), validate and, where possible, enrich the data and pass it on to the first responders in the field. The generalists who work with additional information sources such as social media platforms and applications that can enrich social media data -the Twitcident project being one example -to provide the centralists with additional information.
Over a period of two months, we observed how the interaction between the generalists and centralists took place, and how Twitcident added to the quality of the information exchange, if at all. We selected this style of ethnographic research and in-situ research in order to gain a fuller picture of the context of the response room and the background to the routines of the generalists and centralists (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009 ). The generalists wrote daily diaries or logbooks, which were very useful in helping us to understand their actions and see what kind of data analysis they undertook with Twitcident. We were also able to get access to formal documents about the pilot project and to the work manuals and standard operational procedures used by the generalists and centralists.
The objectives of this chapter are first of all to understand how pilot projects function as a 'protected space' for introducing and testing new, contested information technologies. Second, we would like to present an actual case in the context of a demanding environment, i.e., the emergency response room, where the time pressures constrain a smooth introduction of new technologies.
BACKGROUND
In the literature on emergency management, adopting a COP is proposed as the solution to poor communication and information-sharing practices in and between response organizations (Wolbers & Boersma, 2013) . The idea is that a COP is an integrated part of an information system and used to overcome problems such as information overload, or insufficient evaluation and validation of the information. A COP is defined as the display of relevant information shared by more than one command or unit. Potentially, COPs contribute to a better situational awareness, which is the perception of environmental elements during incidents, emergencies and crises with respect to time, space and meaning, critical to the decisionmaking processes of professional first responders (Sarter & Woods, 1991; Bosse, Majdanik, Boersma, & Ingibergsdóttir, 2013) . Adequate information management is seen as a precondition for creating a high-quality COP. Technical solutions are seen as the answer to failing information management. Over the years emergency response rooms information systems have been 'enriched' by a myriad of tools to enable and improve information management and thus the creation of COPs. The newest generation of tools that have been added to emergency response rooms are meant to make social media data suitable for use in emergency response information management.
Social media sites, and Twitter in particular, are seen as an important (additional) source of information in emergency and crisis situations (Mendoza, Poblete, & Castillo, 2010; Schultz, Utz, & Göritz, 2011; Hughes & Palen, 2009; Cassa, Chunara, Mandl, & Brownstein, 2013) . With applications such as Twitcident the centralists in the emergency response rooms can actually follow what citizens post on social media and how citizens' information networks come into being. Twitcident can be seen as part of a larger trend in crisis management and practice to enlarge the number of sources for creation of relevant information. In particular, during actual crises and emergencies, information needs to be up-to-date and dynamic (Treurniet, Messemaker, Wolbers and Boersma, 2015) . Since the crisis or emergency is constantly changing, the centralists demand sources that can deal with the speed of change. Social media sources have the potential to provide a greater quantity of information and more up-to-date information than other, more static, sources such as databases and information from incoming emergency calls.
The use of social media data in crisis and emergency situations is promising, but not without problems. There are serious concerns relating to the quality of the data from social media platforms, the validation of social media data (Yates & Paquette, 2011) , the filtering of relevant information from messy social media data sources (Abel et al., 2012; Oh, Agrawal, & Rao, 2013) , and the process of combining social media data with relevant data from other sources (Vieweg, Hughes, Starbird, & Palen, 2010) . There are also more fundamental problems such as legal issues and questions to do with privacy and surveillance (Van de Walle, Turoff, & Hiltz, 2009; Fuchs, Boersma, Albrechtslund, & Sandoval, 2011) .
Besides the more practical problems relating to the use of social media in emergency and crisis situations, we see that the expectations can be sky-high. The idea that social media data is useful for crisis situations can be seen as information technology hype (Meijer, Boersma, & Wagenaar, 2009) . A hype can be agenda-setting, but in instances where promises cannot be met, users start to be very disappointed. Through a lack of planning or thoughtless introduction and implementation people will no longer buy in to the hype at all in particular when the claims are exaggerated (Ruef & Markard, 2010) . In addition, projects always run the risk of becoming dysfunctional in different project phases, particularly in situations in which there is no common understanding of the project (Van Marrewijk, 2007; Veenswijk, Van Marrewijk, & Boersma, 2010) . Crucial for the success or failure of a project such as Twitcident is a careful and thoughtful plan for its introduction, monitoring and evaluation (Edmondson, Bohmer, & Pisano, 2001) .
In order to be successful, Twitcident must be seen as a social, organizational project and not solely as a technical project (Barley, 1986; Orlikowski, & Barley, 2001 ). However, it has already been known for decades that IT innovation projects are often based on a relatively naïve picture of organizational change. Events, features, and behaviors that are important to the project's success or failure tend to be overlooked (Markus & Robey, 1988; Ciborra & Lanzara, 1994; Mirvis, Sales, & Hackett 2006) . In this chapter, therefore, we will reflect upon Twitcident not only as a useful additional source of information in crisis management, but we will also consider the particular characteristics of the project, and the way it has been introduced and implemented in the organization.
THE INTRODUCTION AND USE OF TWITCIDENT IN THE EMERGENCY CONTROL ROOM SETTING
In 2012 the Dutch safety regions took an important step in optimizing their information management and information processes. This involved the establishment of real-time intelligence centers (RTICs) (Inspectorate of Safety and Justice, 2013). The information technologies used in the RTICs were primarily meant to support police work, but since the centers were housed next to the response rooms, they also started to collect and share information with the fire and ambulance service. The idea behind the RTICs is mainly to create an 'early warning monitoring system'. Centralists are supposed to consult the RTIC information to evaluate and monitor the atmosphere and the behavior of citizens in town centers.
Monitoring citizens' behavior became an issue for the safety regions' bureau after the so-called project X incident, during which social media platforms were used to mobilize people to come together for partying. In 2012 a project X party in the Netherlands got out of hand, because the police could not prevent serious rioting during the party (Van Dijck & Poell, 2013) . Second, the information from the RTIC is supposed to enable centralists, and eventually officers in the field, to create an improved COP of the emergency situation and of the actions and interactions taking place on the ground.
The management of the safety region considered the RTIC the perfect place in which to implement the Twitcident pilot project. Before the introduction of the RTICs to the emergency response rooms, centralist only looked incidentally into social media data, and they had no analytical tools like Twitcident at their disposal.
Setting the Scene: Centralists and Generalists
In order to understand the relative value of Twitcident (and, in a broader sense, social media data), we will describe the organization of the emergency response rooms and their role in the safety region.
The emergency response room and RTIC featured in our study are housed in two rooms next to each other, separated by a glass wall. The rooms are connected by a door that is always open, so that the professionals working there can easily walk from one room to the other, to ask for feedback, exchange information in person, or request validation of decisions or actions. For the generalists it is important to be able to see what is going on in the emergency response room so that they can respond instantly to the 'body language' of their colleagues asking for additional information. The workstations of the centralists and the generalists are very similar.
The centralists in the response room are the dispatchers; they operate the response information systems, take the incoming calls, evaluate the relevance and quality of the information received, and are responsible for disseminating the information to the appropriate first responders on the streets. The centralists have sophisticated communication and information systems at their disposal (Wagenaar, Boersma, Groenewegen, & Niemandsverdriet, 2009 ). About ten years ago, a new integrated information system was introduced for the response rooms, which used the software GMS, the Dutch abbreviation for an Integrated Emergency Room System. This system integrates various services and systems such as the 1-1-2 phone number (the Dutch equivalent of the 9-1-1 emergency number in North America), communication, radio and telephone systems used by first responders, and important databases related to the information needs of the three services, police, fire service and ambulance. One of the GMS screens is a data-entry screen where new information can be added into the database. The other screen shows geographical information about the position of the first responders (e.g., police cars), and the location of the incident. Of course, the centralists use telecommunication devices such as phones, radios and pagers to communicate with citizens and with first responders. The phones are integrated into a system that gives the centralists instant access to the most important numbers (landlines) such as those for hospitals, doctors, police stations and other organizations that are part of the critical infrastructure.
Data entered into GMS by the centralists is visible to those in the three first response services, except for data that are filtered, for example, because of confidential information. The data within GMS can also be consulted by the RTIC generalists. They know which background information will be critical to the first responders, and how to create a COP on the basis of the messages coming in. Their job description includes the need for search skills that enable them to access additional information, and the ability to filter relevant information from social media. This is in contrast to the work of a centralist, who responds to the incoming data in a reactive manner (i.e., after the call has come in, or after an incident has happened). The generalists, however, can enrich data by adding background information such as information on locations, persons, the social environment, and historical detail. This information is entered into GMS using separate files. The generalists can send it to the first responders.
The RTIC's function can be seen as that of an intelligence service -it collects, analyses, and exploits information to support the response room and ultimately the actual response operations (Inspectorate of Safety and Justice, 2013, pp. 33-34) . The generalists also have access to additional systems such as MobiPol, a database with police information, vehicle tracking systems, specific databases, and enterprise resource systems. They can also access Blueview, which contains over 55 million documents with information about criminals and past crimes. And finally, of course, they can consult open information sources such as those on the Internet.
The Introduction of the Twitcident Project
The management of the safety region started to implement the Twitcident project on 1 st April 2014. Their main concern was how the professionals in the response room could use social media data proactively. Our interviews with the centralists revealed that they heard about the project only two days before it was introduced. The manager responsible for the instruction used a PowerPoint presentation to explain the technical functionalities of the project. He also drew attention to the way in which the centralists and generalists should use the tool as an addition to the systems already in use. Since the introduction was done with an emphasis on the technical aspects of the tool, the centralists and the generalists -considered to be the end-users -did not directly understand the main goal of the project and how Twitcident could be integrated into their daily routines and information management practices.
According to the managers that we interviewed some weeks after the introduction, however, the goal of Twitcident was clear: using social media websites as an 'antenna', the centralists were supposed to capture important information from citizens. Social media data could provide an answer, at least in part, to the question 'what is going on in society'. At the same time, for them Twitcident was an important project to see whether and how they could align ideas and practices about the use of social media at times of crisis at a local and national level. Twitcident was for them also a tool for organizational change. Both the centralists and the generalists were provided with a personal account (including login and password) to access Twitcident. This way, the managers coordinating the pilot could check who was using the tool, and what kind of (search) actions were taking place.
The centralists, however, interpreted the tool first and foremost as an enabling instrument that would help enlarge the common operational picture when incidents were taking place. In other words, for them it became an extra sensor that could be used to provide first responders in the field with relevant information about a particular incident. Also, they saw the introduction of the pilot as an attempt by the management to take initiative: with the introduction of Twitcident they could show sensitivity to the hype surrounding social media.
The rather inadequate 'management of expectations' resulted in different and at times conflicting ideas about how Twitcident could be used. The managers could fall back on a mutual feeling that social media data was potentially useful for the centralists' work, but there was no consensus about how that potential could be fully exploited. The centralists doubted from the start whether the Twitcident information would really be helpful to them in their daily operations and at times of crisis. To them it was unclear how they could link the information to other sources of information that they could already access. Also, the centralists had many questions about the way they could make sense of the additional information. While this objection could easily be interpreted as resulting from unfamiliarity with the system, there was another aspect of Twitcident that bothered them a lot. Their concern was that implementing and using Twitcident would be very time-consuming in a situation in which they were already experiencing a heavy workload.
Twitcident in Use
The Twitcident interface contains a set of filters (i.e., search options) that capture and categorize incoming information. The most important filters are tweets and retweets. Retweets are the messages on Twitter that show content that was initially posted ('tweeted') by another user. The format is RT @username where username is the Twitter name of the person one is retweeting. Within Twitcident, the tweets are categorized on the basis of predefined search terms and city names. The search terms represent the types of incident. Table 1 shows the Twitcident interface: the first column contains the city names, and the top row represents the types of incident.
The table shows the number of tweets per city and per incident. The city names and types of incident are not only categories but also hyperlinks. The generalist can use the links to add details of a particular incident, historical data, and the like. Since the software automatically generates data on the basis of the retweets, the generalist's most important task is to enrich the data with background information and details about the location and environment. The generalist can consult the content of the tweets and retweets by clicking on the numbers that pop up in the table. He or she then can decide on the relative urgency of a tweet or retweet and, if needed, delete those hits that simply cause noise in the information stream (e.g., because they contain false or irrelevant information). The generalist also can mark an account as spam, so that Twitcident no longer accepts incoming information from that particular account.
Twitcident also has an archival storage or preservation function because digital information -the tweets and retweets -is easily lost or corrupted. This storage function can help the generalists when they are writing after-action reports or looking at patterns of information.
Analysis and Discussion
The added value of Twitcident for the daily response room practices was disappointing. In the first eight weeks after the introduction of the tool (the same period in which we did our observations), there was no proactive use of the social media data. In other words, the expectations of the management that the tool could be used as an antenna, or 'early warning monitoring' system, were not met. Furthermore, although the generalists and centralists started to work together in the weeks after Twitcident was introduced, the centralists told us that the work of the generalists had little effect on their work routines. From our observations and interviews with centralists and generalists we could discern three main practical problems in the actual implementation and use of Twitcident.
First, the generalists complained about the constraining effect of the pre-defined search terms. The search terms are based on the categories set up by the generalists. For example, they have to categorize incoming calls under terms such as Public Order, Robbery, Fire, etc. Social media data, however, is messy and full of contradictions. Citizens who post a tweet about a burglary use terms such as 'we've had a break-in', 'theft', 'break-in', 'someone's broken in' and the like. In other words, citizens use a variety of terms, including more colloquial language. For the generalists it was challenging, if not impossible, to use the search terms systematically in order 'filter' the social media data. The predefined search terms stopped them from making flexible choices and interpretations of the raw data. The Twitcident software allowed them to add new search terms, but it was very difficult for the generalists to come to a consensus about more adequate categories. Second, the generalists were confronted with different uses and interpretations of the terms by the different first response disciplines. In particular the police have their own terminology, and since most of the Twitter data has to do with public order and safety, they started to dominate the discussion about terms and categories (as is also reflected in the table). The generalists started to adjust the terms, which led to an instant increase in the number of Twitcident hits. The main problem still remained: the search terms turned out to be too specific for the generic use and analysis of social media data.
Third, for the generalists geo-information is crucial for validating tweets and for linking the information to other sources and informing first responders on the ground. Therefore a tweet or retweet is only recognized in Twitcident if it contains geo-information on the sender. Tweets without a geo-location and/ or a city name are filtered out. However, since most people who use Twitter do not add geo-information, most of the data from Twitter turned out to add no value to the information that was already available. Potentially, a lot of valuable data was missed or filtered out.
Alongside these practical issues, we see two more fundamental problems with Twitcident and the way that the social media is, or could be, used in the daily practices and routines of the emergency response room.
First, the generalists and centralists became demotivated in the weeks following the introduction of Twitcident. Social media, and in the case of Twitcident Twitter, was supposed to enrich their job, but in reality the data that came out of Twitcident appeared to be rather poor. On top of that, not a single incident or emergency was filtered out from the social media data that was not already known by the centralists as a result of the 1-1-2 calls. It meant that Twitcident could not meet the management's expectations of being an 'early warning monitoring system' or an antenna for social unrest. During our observations we noticed that some days after it was introduced, the generalists stopped using Twitcident as part of their standard procedure, but instead used it only occasionally and on a relatively ad-hoc basis. They did not invest time in establishing stable routines for using Twitcident. For the centralists it meant that they were not really able to rely on this additional source of information. What made the integration of the Twitcident data even more problematic is that no interconnection (or, in technical terms, interoperability) was possible with GMS or with other systems in use. Instead of being a help to them, Twitcident turned out to be yet another thing they had to deal with. This made it all too easy for them to ignore Twitcident completely. As they told us during the interviews, centralists still believe that Twitcident could be useful, but, given their experiences, they see its added value as being for writing after-action reports, for example.
Second, it was really hard for the centralists to fully appreciate the tool since they were not involved in its design, nor in the implementation process. They saw Twitcident as a management initiative. In the absence of an adequate monitoring process, the result was a significant mismatch between expectations and actual experiences, a problem that is commonly reported in the information technology implementation literature (Fleck et al., 1990) . Twitcident was introduced in a top-down fashion and the management had high expectations, but the professionals who actually had to work with the tool felt a lack of ownership. The work of a centralist can be stressful, particularly during incidents and emergencies. Information overload and time pressures are serious concerns for them, and paradoxically this is especially the case at times when the potential of social media data is at its greatest.
SOLUTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
We have shown in this chapter that the management of the emergency response room and coordinators of the tool had high expectations of the pilot project. In particular they expected Twitcident to be a rich source of instant data not just at times of crisis, but also for day-to-day operations. However, the first results turned out to be disappointing. Not only was the social media data hard to validate (i.e., it was difficult to verify the trustworthiness of the content), but it was also almost impossible to keep up with the amount of data provided by Twitcident. When the centralists tried to use Twitcident to improve their operational picture, they had a difficult time interpreting and validating social media data and linking it to other sources of information. In addition, looking through social media content for 'monitoring' purposes turned out to be useless. This does not mean, however, that the use of social media data has to be abandoned completely by the safety region response rooms.
What needs to happen is first of all that, the generalists and centralists must create a shared understanding of the intended and unintended consequences of social media data for their work. Having a more realistic view of how Twitter, and other social media, could be used in their work will help them to develop new work routines (Feldman & Pentland, 2003) in which the use of this additional information source can be embedded. Twitcident can only be a valuable extra source of information for the centralists if they are clear about why and how they should use it. The dual nature of Twitcident -an early warning monitoring system on the one hand, and a system to enlarge COPs on the other -made that it fell between two stools. Early warning systems need a different type of organizational routine (i.e., scanning big data with broad search terms) than COP development (i.e., a precise and channeled search for adequate additional information about a particular incident). Thinking through the routines in use (Orlikowski, 1992 ) needed for Twitcident is crucial for organizations to use the tool effectively.
Second, Twitcident was seen as yet another information source that could be easily accessed and consulted by centralists. In other words, it was seen as an 'information warehouse' where users could select information that was relevant to them in performing their tasks. Unconsciously, they assumed that they could simply select information from the warehouse database to help them in executing their task because (as with any other information database) the information was supposed to be stored in an easy and accessible form (Davenport, 1998) . However, to regard Twitcident as a warehouse dataset will lead to a failure of the tool. Instead, the use of Twitcident data must be based on a collective sensemaking perspective. Centralists and generalists have to realize that they (knowingly or unknowingly) give meaning to information and that their sensemaking can differ from that of other people because there are differences in routines, beliefs and assumptions that can potentially lead to misinterpretation of information (Wolbers & Boersma, 2013) . Upfront there is no guarantee that social media data can contribute to creating COPs or help organizations to monitor behavior. If Twitcident is to contribute to the control room information management, the stakeholders involved (the response room's management, generalists, centralists, and first responders) all have to reflect upon their sensemaking process. In other words, simply sending data from Twitcident from the RTIC room to the emergency response room and on to the first responders is useless. It has to have meaning attached, and the only way to do that is to talk about the information (Weick, 1988) so that people can then understand the constraints, and start to appreciate the relative value of the data source.
Finally, the Twitcident project lacked a proper project plan -there was no thoughtful introduction or implementation strategy, let alone a monitoring process. For Twitcident to be successful, the management needs to invest far more in 'managing expectations'. Earlier studies of new technology implementation have shown that top-down introduction of new technologies in organizations can have a disruptive effect. Those who implemented such technologies successfully underwent a qualitatively different learning process than those who were unsuccessful. Important steps in this process are: enrollment, preparation, trials, and reflection (Edmonson et al., 2001 ). In the Twitcident case it means that the users -generalists and centralists -have to be involved in the further use of the tool, and develop the motivation needed to use it. Being more reflective about their work would encourage a learning process to begin, and would allow them to develop new routines for using social media data. From our interviews it is clear that it is not too late for this, since the centralists still believe that there is value to be gained from using social media data, but only if they can embed this in their information management routines.
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
Twitcident was introduced, implemented and used in an emergency response room setting as part of a pilot project. For further research it would be interesting to study the subsequent development of Twitcident, and to analyze the pros and cons of using social media data for emergency response in a more systematic manner. For example, one could look at the use of social media data by first responders in major crisis situations or disasters. It might be that disruptions of this kind would also make the generalists' searching of social media sites more targeted.
It is also known that the hectic environment in the emergency response room -with time pressure on the centralists -influences the way that information streams are managed. Therefore, it might be useful to look at how projects using similar applications are used in other settings where the time pressures are not so great -for example, in marketing or consumer insight activity. (Evans, 2012; Tuton & Solomon, 2014) .
Clearly, projects such as Twitcident can only succeed if they are carefully embedded in an organization's information management. A future research direction might therefore be to study social media as part of the wider and more complex information architecture of an organization (Koltay, 2011) to understand the conditions in which the social media data can become part of the structural design of shared information environments.
Finally, we need to research and understand how people make sense of social media data in complex organizational settings. This chapter has shown that in order to use social media data successfully, we have to take seriously the sensemaking processes of who are trying to interpret that data. This would require us to look at the social aspects of social media implementation and use. In times of uncertainty, people try to make sense of the situation and the incoming information. It is important that we start to understand how people in organizational (in our case centralists and generalists) take cues from social media data that help them decide which information is relevant for their work. In other words, we need to explore creatively the way in which meaning is attached to social media (see, for example, Bechmann & Lomborg, 2013) .
CONCLUSION
The emergency control room's management had high expectations of the pilot project Twitcident, as they expected it to be a rich source of instant data not just at times of crisis, but also for monitoring processes in daily situations. This dual nature, however, was never adequately explained to the professionals who had to work with it -the centralists and generalist. In fact, the implementation process has been done in a top-down fashion. Therefore, the generalists and centralists never developed a full understanding of the meaning and potential usefulness of Twitcident for their work, which had eventually a negative effect on the success of the tool.
Perhaps the most important outcome of our study into the Twitcident project is that professional response organizations have to think in advance what to do with social media data and how they want to use it. Social media data is not clean; it is messy, full of contradictions, and therefore difficult to integrate into the daily operations of the centralists. The professionals have to develop the skills to actually make sense of social media data. They have to ask themselves the question: what does this data actually mean? What does it mean for my operations, for my information management, and how does it interfere, complement or align with other information sources that we are already using?
Our study makes clear that social media data and information are not very useful if the organization does not know how to link this additional source of information to its other information streams. In other words, social media has to be strategically integrated into the overall information management of the crisis response organization in order to be of use. Our case has clearly shown that the introduction of social media (i.e., here the Twitcident project) to the emergency response room must be treated as part of a careful learning process that includes enrolment, preparation, trial and testing out. This is the only way for such projects to be successful.
